Due to the high impact of concentration of ownership on the auditing fee the relationship between supervision on the directorate structure and auditing fees is dependent to concentration of ownership and concentration of ownership have a significant role in the relation between monitoring the directorate structure and audit fee and increase and a decrease of concentration of ownership influences the relationship board dimensions and audit fee strongly. This study aims to investigate the impact of concentration of ownership on the relationship between institutional owners to the directorate independence and audit fee accepted companies in the Tehran stock market. In this study with using systematic removal method, a sample of 122 companies was accepted from listed companies in The Tehran stock market during the period from 2011 to 2016. According to variables and theoretical fundamentals of research 3 hypothesis has been raised for the research and test of hypothesis were used to the method of relative economics. The result of the first to third hypothesis test showed that concentration of ownership moderates the relationship between the directorate and audit fee of listed companies in the Tehran stock market.
INTRODUCTION
Essentially, studies about corporate government, have been paid attention to the subject of conflict of interests among the managers and partners [first -order representation problems]. While according to studies the ownership of shareholders are more focused because poor support from shareholders has provided motivation to collect more stock for better control on the company managers. As a result in countries with poor support from shareholders decrease first-order problems of representation. But the problems will increase among minority and majority shareholders. [Second-order representation problems] .Though the existence of an audit can be useful as a powerful defence mechanism to reduce the problems arising representations, however, the existence of independent directorate can also be influenced as another corporate governance mechanism to solve such problems. There is empirical evidence shows independent directorate decreases the amount of administrative fraud [1] .
Institutional shareholders from another group have an important role in the ownership structure which distinct from other owners because of great functionality professional financial analysis.
This category of owners cares about the quality of information and due to the inherent features and special influence on management, encourages them to use high-quality audit services and lead to an increase of audit fee finally [2] .
Of course increase of such focused owners and their active monitoring on the company operations reduces costs of representation and risk of control in financial reporting decreases the auditing fee consequently [3] .
One of the effective factors of auditing fee is a combination of the directorate and the existence of intra-organisational manager in the Directorate. Karcelo and Partners 2002 in their research realised that the relationship between directorate and auditing service may be formal or informal. The formal aspect is that directorate chooses the auditor for the satisfaction of shareholders and during the contract determines all the goals of auditing and the recommended fee. The informal aspect of the relationship is that the existence of an efficient directorate is the reason for auditor trying to present his services with optimal quality which provides customer satisfaction and protects the interests of shareholders. The result shows that directorate tries to maintain his advantage reputation [4] Gilson 1990, to do his legal obligations [5] and eventually protect from interests of shareholders with high-quality auditing employment. On the other hand it can be expected whatever the quality of benefit increase it means more monitoring and higher health reporting level and consequently, auditing as a supervisory mechanism, requires fewer resources [6] . In theory, representative control is the most important task of directorate and concentration of ownership has an important role to increase control performance. The concentration of ownership is a control tool in the company which determines the power of directorate. Research shows that the concentration of ownership of a company influences the control level and lack of detecting risk. It determines demand in external auditing Guarantee services. In addition to, in the desired balance, benefits among managers and shareholders adverse effect of representation costs in financial reporting which is the reason for decrease auditing risk resulted in a decrease of auditing fee.
In first researches by Simunic 1996 [7] and second studies showed that in recent years auditing fee is more related to, measure, complexity, risks and another auditing intrinsic factors. In recent years the effect of centralisation of ownership [directorate and auditing committee] has been considered on auditing fee. There is more motivating for this research because it will increase responsibility, directorate control and auditing committee in the financial reporting process. Low and regulations of corporate sovereignty emphasis on the importance of the relationship between internal and external auditors with company directorate and organisational management. The concentration of ownership determines that how much ownership is concentrated in the hand of individual shareholders and it has arisen for placement of control company affairs and cover auditing demand level [8] .
Little Academic research had about auditing fee and features of corporate sovereignty. The result of several studies shows that there is a positive relationship between auditing fee and features of corporate sovereignty, because demand for strongly corporate sovereignty is related to more quality of auditing [9] . Fan wong Ghicas and partners]. In general, we can conclude that the auditing fee is influenced by replacement relationship two kinds of problems of representation. Though so far few studies have been done to relationships among the second type of problems of representation with auditing fee. In this research, we will investigate that is there a relation between the concentration of ownership and amount of auditing fee? At the end we will analyse there a relation between directorate combination and if the auditing fee is influenced by the concentration of ownership or not?
THEORETICAL BASIS AND RESEARCH RECORD
According to the low, auditors are a significant part of ownership companies. Because they are important tools to protect the rights of investors. An auditor investigates the performance of directorate determining the auditing fee. About the relation between the concentration of ownership and directorate and auditing fee, there are two reasons.
From the point of view directorate with more independence and consequently more concentration of ownership has much interest to verify the effectiveness of his monitoring and so the act of external auditing is more attendant. This increases the role of directorate control with increase auditing scope and so increases the auditing fee.
From another point of view directorate with more independence and more corporation ownership company, emphasis to control environment. So auditor's assessment is reduced from the risk of control and also the breadth of the auditing method reduces, so auditing fee reduces [10] .
According to representation theory, the amount of demand for auditing services is related to the degree of concentration of ownership of the company.
According to this a company with varied ownership, need to auditors with high skill chosen by the shareholder's group. Because ownership is a mechanism of corporate sovereignty, great shareholders have active control and high effect to choose of management policies and strategies for giving financial statement information.
Since the structure of ownership is from the main mechanisms and is from determination internal factors of companies strategic systems and on the other hand auditing as an independent professional has a great responsibility to accreditation financial reports for the community of user's. Financial information is a tool to reduce the dangers of investments, improve the quality of the internal organisation, increasing the level of outturn arising from trade securities and improvement of people investment basket structure and different groups. Favourable corporate governance system makes confidence to use of companies from their properties, also it will consider the benefits of a wide range of stockholders and community in which they work. According to a theoretical discussion about owners who have top-grade corporate governance, we can expect that auditing information prepared by this companies, had desirable ability to trust. On the other words with increasing the quality of auditing information, the probability of fraud, distortion and other types of bad currents, in companies financial statements is minimised and become reasonable and logical to provide acceptable comment by independent auditors [11] . In short, it can be said according to the following items, Iran provides an appropriate background to review of this kind.
Because first there are weak supportive laws from shareholders. Second sovereignty concentration in accepted companies in Stock Market securities is relatively high. Third, the amount of government attendance in companies as a shareholder is significant and then with the implementation of 44 principle general policies, we will see the extensive presence of institutional shareholder in ownership transfer process to the private sector. For economic decisions we need information according to them assigns available resources. One of the most important factors in making the right decision is suitable and relating information about the subject of decision which is process properly will have negative effects on the decision maker [12] . According to loss concentration of ownership in the big institutes and the presence of non-obligated members in the directorate, problems arise from representation in companies and increase the need the external auditing. According to the theoretical basis and high impact of concentration of ownership on the auditing fee, relationship between supervising the directorate structure and auditing fee is related to the concentration of ownership and concentration of ownership can have a great role in relationship between supervising the directorate structure and auditing fee and decrease and increase of concentration of ownership will affect strongly the relationship dimensions of the directorate and auditing fee and for this research is very necessary In Iran.
Richard Bozecmohameddia [13] in their article entitled "to survey control on directorate and auditing fee" survey the effect of concentration of ownership on the relationship between directorate combination and auditing fee in a period 2002 to 2008 on Canada stock market. Their research results showed that in companies with more centralised directorate there is a positive relation between directorate combination and auditing fee.
Salim [14] in his article entitled "concentration of ownership, family firms and the chances of selecting on auditor in emerging financial markets" survey the influenced concentration of ownership and family firms for auditing request with high quality on Indonesia stock market. Their research results show that companies with high concentration have more willingness to employ great auditing companies when a company handles with family this relation is negative.
Kasai [6] in the study entitled ownership structure, auditing fee and auditing quality in Japan, there is evidence that how the relationships among accounting.
Obligation items (is measured with obligation items quality) and unusual auditing fees are moderated by ownership structure.
Results
show that high auditing fee, compromises auditors independence and consequently auditing quality is reduced.
These results show that the existence of high institutional shareholders increases the quality of obligatory items. In addition about the relationship among auditing quality and auditing, fee understands that this relation is moderate with institutional shareholders. Ben Ali & Lesage [8] in studies which entitled auditing pricing and the nature of control shareholders: evidence from France. Looking for the answer to this question that, will auditors be used to reduce representation costs from different ownership types as a controlling mechanism or not? They used from Symonic model of auditing fee to consider the impact of controlling shareholders on the auditing fee in accepted companies in French Stock Market.
According to the results, there is an inverse relationship among auditing fee and government shareholders and there is a direct relationship among auditing fee and institutional shareholders but, there is no relationship among auditing fee and family shareholders. These results show the combined effects of the nature of ownership on the auditing fee. Hu and partners [15] investigate the relationship among institutional ownership and auditing fee. The sample they studied contains 1428 accepted companies in Chinese Stock Market in2008. The result of their research shows that the companies control by central government pay fewer auditing fee than companies were controlled by local governments. Dicender and partners in their investigation about the relationship between corporate governance features and auditing fee concluded that auditing services and directorate independence when the ownership is scattered are complementary, which show that centralised ownership and directorate combination are suitable alternatives for each other to control the management and also concluded that there is relationship among directorate combination [independence and duality of manager] and auditing fee. Nasirzadeh and Gholami [16] Investigate the effect of avoiding tax from auditing fee and effect of company management mechanisms on the relationship between avoiding tax and auditing fee. In this research will investigate the relationship between auditing fee with variables avoiding tax, types of auditing institution, institutional ownership, directorate independence, reaction of tax and the type of auditing institution, reaction of avoiding tax and institutional shareholders and the reaction of tax and directorate independence. Testing research hypothesis has been done with help of combined data regression model. The results of the research showed that financial expertise and independence auditing committee have a positive and meaningful relationship with auditing fee. But there is no meaningful relationship between the size of the auditing committee and auditing fee. Also in relating to control data used to this research, findings showed that there is a positive and meaningful relationship between financial leverage, the ratio of incoming and stock goods, size of auditing institute and number of directorate meetings with auditing fee. Derakhshi and partners [2015] checked out the effect of ownership structure and financial structure on the auditing fee among accepted companies in The Tehran Stock Market. For this reason with the use of research condition, choose 92 companies as a sample period from 2007 to 2013. The research method is after the occurrence and method of analysing data is correlation and regression. In this research, they used a variety of institutional ownership investors, free float stocks concentration of ownership, governmental ownership as an ownership structure indicators and also a debt to asset ratio, long-term debt ratio to a non-current asset, capital cost rates indicator financial structure. Research results show that the concentration of ownership and government ownership has a positive effect on auditing fee and institutional ownership investor has negative effect on it. Mohammad Azadi and Mohammadi [3] have an article had been entitled: Institutional ownership, the concentration of ownership and auditing fee. The goal of this research is to check out the effect of institutional ownership and owners concentration on the auditing fee services. For this reason from financial statements of 51 companies which accepted from 2008 to 2012 were collected and analysed with Eviews software. The results show a lack of relationship between institutional ownership with auditing fee and relationship between the concentration of ownership with auditing fee evaluated meaningfully and positively.
RESEARCH GOALS AND HYPOTHESES
According to the importance of the effect of concentration of ownership supervisory on the relationship between directorate performance and auditing fee the general goal of this research is the effect of concentration of ownership on the relationship between directorate performance and auditing fee in accepted companies in The Tehran Securities Stock Market. According to studies and theoretical bases, the research hypothesis is presented as follow:
Substantive hypothesis
The concentration of ownership moderates the relationship between directorate and auditing fee of accepted companies in The Tehran Securities Stock Market.
Sub hypothesis
1-Concentration of ownership focus has a meaningful effect on the auditing fee of accepted companies in The Tehran Securities Stock Market. 
Independent variable

INS:
The percentage kept by public and governmental companies is from the total equity capital which contains this company: Insurance companies, financial companies, banks, governmental institutions and the other parts of government.
INDP:
Managers independence that will be obtained from the division of independent directors to the whole members of the directorate.
Control variable
BIG: Virtual variable which is the auditor of auditing company takes number1 otherwise 0. Optype= The kinds of auditor comments encoded as follow:
1: Accepted with explanation clause 2: Conditional 3: Failure to comment or reject SIZE: Reagents the size of the company. LEVERAGE: Financial leverage company which is equal with total debt divided by total assets. B/mi,t: the ratio of the book value to the market value of the company.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics included the set of methods that apply for, collection, briefing, classification and description of numerical facts. In the other word descriptive statistical shows information about central parameters and dissemination of research data. So the most important function of these variables is understood better the result of the test.
Inferential Statistics
Determine a suitable model for regression estimating the model
According to existing research literature and also the nature of the research hypothesis in this research used combined data. 
Regression hypothesis model Variance Heterogeneity
Before doing any interpretation of regression results we must investigate model hypothesis to verify results and make assurance from the ability to retrieve model regression results.
In this research preventing false regression is used from compatible covariance matrix to strengthen regression against variance heterogeneity.
Self-affiliation:
To check out lack of selfaffiliation in the results of the regression model is used from Watson-camera state. If the state of Watson -the camera is among 1/5 and 2/5there is no self-affiliation problem between remnants. According to tables 4 to 6 there isn't a selfaffiliation problem between the remnants.
To check out lack of coherent is used from variance inflation index test. When states indicators less than 10 shows the lack of consistent. When this indicator is between 10 and 30 shows moderate coherent and when is more than 30shows intense coherent. According to table 3 and variables, variance inflation index size which is less than 10 was found that it isn't coherent between research variables.
Research hypothesis test
First hypothesis is explained as follow:
Concentration of ownership has a meaningful effect on auditing fee of accepted companies in The Tehran Securities Stock Market. According to zero hypothesis which is based on concentration of ownership is meaningful in 95 confidence level and is equal with zero that shows a lack of effect of variables on independence variable. Just Tables 4 and 5 show, concentration of ownership probability level is less than 0/05, so zero hypothesis failed and this variable is meaningful. This subject means that concentration of ownership influences the auditing fee of accepted companies in The Tehran Securities Market. According to calculated effect coefficient for CON variable is equal to [0/12], shows that this variable is chosen in the sample has a positive and direct effect on auditing fee of accepted companies. The adjusted determined coefficient in the model is equal with 0/99, shows 99% changes of the dependent variable is explained by the right side variables model. On the other hand, no difference between the adjusted coefficient determination [ADJ-R2] shows that independent variables added to the model chosen correctly. Although 1%from dependent variable changes didn't explain by the right side variables according to F fisher state and significance level of it, can be said this model can relate independent variable with dependent one.
Second hypothesis is explained as follow:
"Concentration of ownership moderates the relationship between directorate independence and auditing fee of accepted companies in The Tehran Securities Stock Market."  Recommended to the directors of the stock organisation to the rules about corporate governance and a compulsory minimum of the concentration of ownership, increase the quality of auditing companies.  According to results of the second hypothesis the level of concentration is the ownership of one of the influential factors on a relationship between directorate independence and auditing fee recommend to analysers that analyse the auditing fee with the degree of concentration of ownership and don't conclude one-sided conclusions about the level of auditing fee.
 According to lack of researches that consider the concentration of ownership as a determining factor, auditing institutes and auditing organisations can use from the results of this research in order to initial estimated from auditing fee have a better evaluation than the existence potential representation problems is related to presence of such owners in company.  Potential shareholders can improve their investment decisions, according to results of this research and similar researches about kinds of companies ownership, and know more about how to influence the types of owners in companies on the desired company.
